Ledamoten Peter Hore skriver om svenska marinen och Nato.
Hore är brittisk sjöofficer och författare till flera böcker inom det marina området. Hans sista befattning som aktiv officer var att leda Royal Navy´s Defence Studies.
Ledamoten Peter Hore
Article 5
The principle of collective defence is the major feature of NATO and it is the unique and enduring principle which binds its members together. The strapline “An attack on one is an attack on” commits NATO members to protecting each other and helps to create a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance. Specifically, Article 5 of the founding treaty said:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Char- ter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Originally Article 5 covered an attack on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of members of NATO when in or over member territories including the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer. Presumably with the accession of Finland and Sweden to the NATO alliance, this ‘insurance over’ will in future include the Bal- tic Sea, stretching up to some limit in the Gulf of Finland. More recently Article 5 has widely interpreted to include threats beyond the North Atlantic and across the Tropic of Cancer, for example, Afghanistan. Most recently American and British authorities have said that any deliberate attack against the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine which could cause radiation leaks over NATO members in Western Europe would be a breach of Article 5.
NATO as an industry standard
For Sweden, the process of joining NATO need not be difficult. NATO, besides being an alliance, whose members can be named and enumerated, is also an industry standard. In some cases, Sweden has used NATO’s Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs) sin- ce the mid-1950s, and increasingly so since the end of the Cold War. These STANAGs cover a wide range of practises and procedures, for example, nomenclature, communi- cations, fuel specifications, fuel couplings. Swedish armed forces are already familiar with these industry standards through their deployment to Afghanistan (ISAF 2001- 14 and RSM 2015-21), and by participation in the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (2102-onwards) which draws upon forces from Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and – even though they were then outside the NATO alliance – from Finland and Sweden.
Rights and Responsibilities – Swedish exceptionalism
Joining NATO will be a powerful protective blanket against a traditional enemy, Russia, which under its president has become increasingly irredentist and aggressive. Whi- le Finland and Sweden are both advanced societies which will bring modern armed forces to NATO’s order-of-battle, the prime benefit to Sweden in joining NATO is to ensure the defence of Sweden and to deter an attack by Russia. Article 5 means that an attack on Sweden is an attack upon the member states, and that Sweden will have the right to the support of other NATO countries, should it be attacked. However, should another NATO member state be attacked, it is Sweden’s responsibility to consider this as an attack upon itself and to assist in defending other countries accordingly.
The Royal Swedish Navy has the potential to make a particular contribution to NATO. The RSwN is expert in Swedish littoral and Baltic Sea operations in green- and brown-water. It has specialized in operating small conventionally powered submarines (SSKs), corvettes and patrol boats, mine-countermeasures and amphibious craft in these waters, besides a force of icebreakers which currently are civilian crewed. However, while Swedish submarines have successfully deployed to the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic (west of Ireland), the Norwegian Sea, and to the Pacific, there is only one surface ship capable of limited, blue-water operations (HMS Carlskrona).
Sweden is also exceptional among the smaller European nations and members of NATO in possessing a significant and successful defence industry, with exports to other countries, and, during the Cold War, was largely able to arm itself.
So, as well as benefiting from the right to mutual defence given under Article 5, Sweden has also the responsibility – and the capability – to give mutual defence under the NATO umbrella. It is easy to see how specialist Swedish naval forces might augment a NATO deployment or task force. With its current force structure, the RSwN would be capable of contributing to Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups 1 and 2. However, it would not be capable of contributing to the destroyers and fri- gates of Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 or 2 (formerly STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED) which conduct blue-water operations in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
Other Models
A potential model for a future Swedish Navy within NATO is the Belgium Navy. Its declared speciality to NATO is in minesweeping and specifically in the Narrow Seas, that is the southern North Sea and eastern English Channel. Nevertheless, Belgium also maintains a small force of blue-water frigates who contribute to Belgian and NATO defence not only defending seaborne communications against air, surface or underwater attack, but also, with the support of its NATO allies, in deterring and defending against crises rising from the infringements of the principles of international law both in Belgian’s EEZ as well as in sovereignty in the other maritime zones.
Though Belgium’s defence industry and its EEZ are much smaller than Sweden’s, the Belgium Navy uses its blue-water ships to support national diplomacy and foreign trade, technical and military collaboration with allies, oceanography, fisheries protection, and deterrent operations by participation in standing allied squadrons, i.e., Stan- ding NATO Maritime Group 1 which is a component of the NATO Response Force. Recent operations have included anti-drug operations in the Caribbean, United Nations operations in the Adriatic, NATO-led anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, and as escorts in a French-led carrier battle group.
Swedish Overseas Trade and Interests
Sweden’s defence industry is much larger, Sweden has overseas interests in trade and diplomacy, and some 500 Swedish-flagged or Swedish-owned ships on the high seas – in blue-water. However, as the Stena Impero incident showed, Sweden relies on other nations to do its business. The model of the Belgium Navy, its role and its force structure, enabling it to contribute to blue-water operations, might be a good model for the RSwN to follow.
New Ships
The cost of designing and building a warship from scratch are enormous, and Belgium’s blue-water frigates were acquired from the Netherlands. However, while many countri- es have little or no defence industry, Sweden has a strong domestic and internationally significant defence industry. By collaborating with other NATO nations, Sweden would be able to share the overheads acquiring new ships, to piggy-back on larger acquisition programmes, and perhaps even to win an industrial share of larger, series production. An example of a NATO programme which Sweden might join is the Netherlands and German Navies cooperation towards replacing their De Zeven Provinciën-class frigates and the Sachsen-class frigates from 2030 onwards. Another programme which might be considered are British Type 26 frigate (with sales to Australia and Canada) or the Type 31 frigate which has been sold to Sweden’s neighbour Poland. The British Type 31 general purpose frigate, based on the hull of the Iver Huitfeldt class of air defence frigates in service with the Royal Danish Navy, offers the possibility of a high level of naval compatibility in the Baltic.
Conclusions and Recommendations
On accession to NATO, Sweden gains rights to the defence of Sweden by other NATO allies, but also acquires responsibilities towards the defence of NATO at large. Sweden is familiar with the NATO industry standard and would have little problem in assimila- ting into NATO force structures as a fulltime member. The Swedish Navy has specia- list forces and operating experience in green- and brown-water which it can contribute to NATO operations, but Sweden also has significant overseas (‘out of area’) trade interests which Sweden might be called upon as a NATO member to help defend. It is recommended that the Royal Swedish Navy should acquire a number of suitable ships with a blue-water capability by joining an existing NATO frigate building programme.